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The main objectives of this paper are (1) to document and explain labor 
market arrangements in different agroclimatic and socioeconomic zones on 
the basis of intensive survey da ta ; (2) to explore linkages of transactions in 
labor markets with transactions in other markets such as those for credit, 
draft power, and outputs, as well as linkages between caste status and type 
of labor performed; and (3) to characterize, as far as possible, the changes, 
if any, in labor relations over time. 
The paper complements the papers by Jodha (chapter 5) and by Ryan 
and Ghodake (chapter 9) also presented in this volume. The villages and the 
regions, as well as the data gathering processes, are described in Jodha 's 
paper, which focuses on tenancy relations. The R y a n - G h o d a k e paper is a 
quantitative assessment of wages, opportunity cost of labor, and working 
hours of individuals who participate in the daily labor market. In this paper 
the focus is on the institutional mechanisms in the daily market and on the 
market for regular farm servants (RFSs).1 In the first section we discuss 
common features of the labor markets studied. The second section focuses 
on differences in labor demand and income in the three study areas; the 
third is concerned with differences in markets for RFSs and contract workers. 
In the last section we interpret the evidence and put forth further hypotheses 
regarding monopsony labor demand, intercaste competition, market seg-
mentation, and interlinked transactions. 
Useful comment s on an early draft were made by Pranab Bardhan , Mark R, Rosenzweig, 
and Benjamin Whi t e ; the improvements made since this early version owe much to them. The 
assistance of the Internat ional Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics ( ICRISAT) 
in carrying out the work on which this paper is based is gratefully acknowledged. 
Submitted as conference paper no. 94 by the Internat ional Crops Research Institute for the 
Semi-Arid Tropics . 
1. We use the term "regular farm se rvan t" ( R F S ) for any laborer whose labor contract 
exceeds three months . 
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The paper is based on several different types of data from the ICRISAT 
village-level studies as (VLS), as explained in table 8.1 (for details of the 
regions and villages, see chapter 5). The basic sample is the penel of 240 
households that have been interviewed monthly as par t of the VLS of the 
ICRISAT since May 1975. Panel interviews focusing on labor relations were 
conducted from May to August 1979 with members of all farm-size groups, 
but emphasis was given to collection of information from RFSs. In addition, 
special informants were selected by four of the authors of this paper, who 
had resided in these villages for more than two years as investigators. The 
special informants were primarily asked questions about changes in labor 
relations over time. Even this information was insufficient to help us under-
stand the rather special features of the Aurepalle labor market discussed 
in this paper. Therefore, in January and February of 1980 a three-caste 
census was carried out, from which a further random sample was chosen 
for the collection of information on wages and other data . We will refer to 
these data sources as necessary. 
COMMON FEATURES OF THE LABOR MARKETS 
The labor markets in these six villages consist of several submarkets, as 
shown in figure 8.1. The irregular market is divided into a market for daily 
rated labor, where payment is made every day for a fixed number of hours 
worked; and a market for contract jobs , where farmers or a government 
agency (directly, or via contractors or labor brokers) give out work—usually 
on a piece-rate basis. Daily incomes from contract jobs are generally higher 
than from daily rated jobs , although contract jobs often require longer hours 
and/or more strenuous work. As opportunities arise, individuals change from 
the contract j o b market to the daily rated markets and vice versa. 
Access to contract jobs is gained via personal networks that may be 
caste related in some of the villages. Groups for harvesting work or earth-
work, or groups of temporary migrants are organized by male leaders who 
sometimes have formed fairly stable groups with other households. The 
females recruited into these groups are most often wives or other family 
members. Groups for hand weeding and paddy transplanting are most 
often organized by female leaders. 
F rom the interviews with the panel members and with the special 
informants, it was clear that male-female differences play an important role 
in access to contract jobs almost everywhere. Caste appeared to play a 
minor role in the Akola region and the Sholapur region, whereas caste was 
frequently mentioned as a basis of group formation in the Mahbubnagnr 
area, especially in Aurepalle. This was one of the reasons for organizing 
the three-caste census and the random sample there, In the process of 
collecting that information we recognised how difficult it is to understand 
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the impact of caste on access to labor opportunities, both because informants 
are not always conscious of it and because they do not like to mention it. 
Many other features of the villages indicate that our first impression con-
cerning the lesser importance of caste in access to contract jobs in the 
Maharashtra regions is correct, but a follow-up inquiry of the type made 
in Aurepalle is currently being carried out in order to trace even subtle 
influences that might still be present. 
In contrast to the contract labor market, the most striking characteristic 
of the daily rated market for farm work is its essentially impersonal nature. 
In the evening employers and their RFSs or the wives of the RFSs will go 
to the workers ' houses and invite them for work.2 Although they may have 
preferences for certain workers, especially for jobs requiring certain skills, 
employers are willing to hire anyone capable of doing the job in this market, 
regardless of caste or other socioeconomic relationship, if a preferred worker 
is not available. Similarly, workers are willing to work for any employer. 
One effect of this is that workers work for a large number of employers in 
the course of the year.3 (Answers to a question on this point range from 
twenty employers per year to much higher numbers.) The daily rated market, 
al though less attractive than the market for contract jobs , at least appears 
to give everyone a chance to participate on nearly equal terms. 
A second characteristics, which may stem from the impersonality of 
relationships in this market , is that a daily rated worker cannot under any 
circumstances get a loan or an advance from an employer on the basis of a 
promise that he will work for him in a peak period whenever needed. This 
is in contrast to findings of Bardhan and Rudra (1978) in eastern India. 
Without collateral, workers can only obtain loans (interest-bearing debt) 
or advances (noninterest-bearing debt) from employers by entering into a 
R S F relationship for a minimum of three months in Akola or for a minimum 
of one year in all other areas. In all these areas, it is nearly impossible for 
landless laborers to obtain loans from farmers or moneylenders4 without 
other collateral such as sheep and goats, gold, and utensils, or regular 
2. Workers generally do not go and ask farmers for work . Only in Sholapur do some of 
them do so when very few work opportuni t ies are available. It seems that asking for work 
puts one in a very poor bargaining position. 
3. Obviously, it is possible for bo th farmers and laborers to avoid partners whom they 
consider inappropr ia te because of relative caste s ta tus ; high-caste workers arc not usually 
expected to work for very low-caste landholders . 
4. They can occasionally get small loans in the ne ighborhood of Rs 5-10 from shop-
keepers, farmers, or friends. But any a m o u n t in excess of roughly Rs 2 0 - 5 0 requires collateral 
in the form of long-term labor, or assets, or regular income. Also , in Sholapur some farmers 
will occasionally accept repayment of a small loan in the form of work if the borrower cannot 
repay in cash and if the farmer requires labor. But such an agreement is never made when the 
loan is given. 
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income from activities such as toddy tapping. The consequence of this, 
as we shall see, is that a primary motive for entering an R F S arrangement 
is the possibility of salary advance or loans. 
Third, we did not observe tenants or their family members providing 
labor to their landlord's farm on a preferential basis, in either the regular 
or the irregular market. Jodha (chapter 5), however, found a few poor 
landlords working regularly for wages for their tenants in Sholapur as part 
of the terms of the contract. 
Four th , with the exception of harvesting, agricultural daily rated tasks 
are sex specific. Males do plowing, female do transplanting and weeding. 
Even in harvesting and threshing, many operations (such as winnowing) 
are often done by members of one sex only. However, there are some regional 
variations in the sexual division of labor. The regular submarket is clearly 
divided between males and females. In the whole inquiry we found (in the 
three-caste census) only one female working as an RFS , watching fields. 
Among the RFSs the plowmen are mostly adults between sixteen and thirty 
years of age. Herdsmen are usually young boys of ten years or older. Watch-
men may be elderly men who are not strong enough for other work ; they 
may also be boys. Domestic servants are females or young boys. Outside 
sweeping is a one- or two-hour j o b performed daily by females, usually 
drawn from any low caste. Women and RFSs from ex-untouchable castes 
are still excluded from jobs inside the home. 
In the regular labor market , linkages with the employer other than via 
debt are unusual. Of the ninety-eight R F S contracts signed by households 
in the panel, only three contracts were noted that stipulated that employers 
should provide bullocks to the RFS to work on the land of the RFS , and in 
all three contracts the bullock rental rate was to be deducted from the wages 
of the R F S . With a few exceptions (in Aurepalle), RFS relationships do 
not constitute long-term or complex patron-client relationships.5 They are 
usually confined to the labor and credit/advance contract, are often of short 
duration, and usually do not involve other family members. As can be seen 
from columns 3 and 4 of tables 8.2 and 8.3, families in all areas tend to put 
only one of their members in this relationship at a time. The number of panel 
members currently serving as an RFS exceeds the number of families having 
5. We did observe a single very long-term relationship in Shirapur in which a son worked 
as an R F S for thirty-four years, for the same farmer for whom his father had previously worked 
for a total of more than thirty years. This worker family belonged to the caste of Mahars (ex-
untouchables, c o m m o n in Maharash t ra where many of them have become Buddhists) whose 
occupation has traditionally been characterized by such long-term relationships. This Maha r 
R F S clearly enjoyed higher wages and superior status relative to other RFSs in the same village; 
the exceptionally favorable circumstances were presumably what induced him to remain in 
this relationship. 
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such members by only 20 percent for all villages combined. Furthermore, 
we did not uncover a single case in the panel where one family sends two or 
more of its members as an R F S to the same farmer. This appears to be a 
sensible arrangement if the possibility of obtaining loans or advances is 
indeed a primary motivat ion; a family would presumably wish to multiply 
rather than to limit its number of potentially useful relationships if seeking 
access to loans or advances in this way. 
Male children and elderly men usually work as herdsmen or watchmen; 
here the credit motivation may not be as overriding. Also, a few RFSs 
believe that this kind of work is physically less demanding than the work 
available in the irregular market. 
The regular market has very few full-time opportunities for women; 
such opportunities are restricted to domestic work in wealthy households. 
Women from ex-untouchable groups are excluded from this opportunity 
as well. A large number of usually low-caste women do part-time work as 
outside sweepers. 
Since the R F S opportunities are restricted to males, women without 
personal assets such as land, jewels, or gold cannot usually raise any loans 
that exceed trivial amounts . The fact that women are excluded from the 
R F S market and often have access to contract jobs only via their male 
family members may also explain the very large wage differences and 
differences in probabilities of employment between males and females 
observed in these villages by Ryan and Ghodake (chapter 9). 
The last common feature is that at tempts by farmers to collude to fix 
wages are common. Farmers in Dokur , Kanzara , and Kinkheda have tried 
to fix daily wages several times but have failed each time. Laborers are 
generally unconcerned about possible success of such at tempts. The large 
yield or quality reductions caused by delays in agricultural operations such 
as seeding, weeding, and harvesting appear to result in competitive pressures 
on the labor demand side that make collusion unsuccessful. 
In Shirapur farmers have tried to fix a (fairly wide) range of cash 
payments to RFSs . These ranges seem to respond to market conditions and 
often are not adhered to by farmers. In contrast to this is the impressively 
successful fixing of salaries and conditions of RFSs in Aurepalle discussed 
in detail below. 
DIFFERENCES IN OVERALL LABOR DEMAND AND INCOME 
This section is a brief discussion of differences in labor demand. Quantitative 
reflections of these differences are given in chapter 9. 
Per family with labor income (column 2, table 8.2), Aurepalle has the 
lowest labor income—only Rs 603. (table 8.4). The demand for agricultural 
labor has very large seasonal variations. On the Alfisols only one crop per 
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year can be grown and irrigation facilities are limited to 12 percent of the 
total cropped area. Soils and rainfall patterns in Aurepalle and Dokur are 
similar, but the extent of irrigation in D o k u r is much greater (32 percent 
of total cropped area) and a substantial proport ion of irrigated area is 
double-cropped, so that agricultural labor demand is both greater and more 
evenly distributed in Dokur than in Aurepalle. Labor incomes per participat-
ing panel family are 50 percent higher in D o k u r than in Aurepalle. Neither 
of the two villages has other nearby sources of labor demand, such as an 
industrial center or government projects. Some families in Aurepalle send 
members as rickshaw pullers to Hyderabad (80 km away), but otherwise 
demand from Hyderabad for unskilled labor does not appear to reach 
this village. Dokur , which is farther away, is even less affected by urban 
labor demand. F rom D o k u r many unskilled laborers migrate temporarily 
over long distances to government projects, but there is no such migra-
tion from Aurepalle. This contrast will be discussed again in the following 
section. 
In the Sholapur district agricultural labor demand probably has as much 
seasonal variation as in Aurepalle. On the most fertile soils only one crop is 
grown, in the postmonsoon season with residual moisture, and irrigation 
amounts to only 9 percent of total cropped area. But nonagricultural demand 
for unskilled or semiskilled labor comes from the city of Sholapur, which is 
a center of the textile industry. In addition, the Maharasht ra government 
operates several government projects within walking distance of the villages. 
The construction of percolation tanks meant to increase groundwater and 
initiated as a relief measure during the severe drought of the early 1970s 
belongs to a longstanding tradition of publicly operated relief projects. 
More recently, construction of a canal was begun that draws labor from 
Shirapur. Labor incomes per participating panel family are therefore as high 
in Shirapur as in Dokur . 
The Akola region is an assured rainfall zone that requires little irrigation. 
It is a highly commercialized area that has been growing cotton as a major 
cash crop for centuries. Cot ton requires large amounts of labor over a fairly 
extended harvesting period that begins after the major food crop, sorghum, 
has been harvested. Nonagricultural demand for unskilled labor comes 
almost exclusively from nearby government-operated land improvement or 
irrigation projects, which have been intensified since the mid-1960s. More 
recently, the Employment Guarantee Program of Maharashtra State makes 
work available in a systematic way during the period between the cotton 
harvest and the onset of the subsequent monsoon. For all these reasons 
labor demand is most steady in the Akola region and this demand is reflected 
in labor incomes of Rs 1,416 per participating household—more than double 
the household labor incomes in Aurepalle. 
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DIFFERENCES IN MARKETS FOR REGULAR FARM SERVANTS AND 
CONTRACT WORKERS 
T h e dif ferences i n t h e ex ten t a n d r egu l a r i t y o f l a b o r d e m a n d a p p e a r t o h a v e 
a m a j o r i m p a c t on t h e n a t u r e a n d l eng th o f c o n t r a c t s e n t e r e d i n t o i n t h e 
m a r k e t fo r R F S s a n d o n t h e m a r k e t for c o n t r a c t j o b s , 
A k o l a D i s t r i c t 
In Akola virtually all wages for hired labor are paid in cash. Because of the 
high and steady labor demand, R F S contracts are for period of three to five 
months between the onset of the monsoon and the beginning of the cotton 
harvest, at which time workers prefer to leave regular employment for 
harvesting work. The R F S contract period is the leanest season and also 
coincides with the high-demand period for plowmen. Of the twenty-four 
RFSs observed in this region, only four had relationships that extended 
more than one year. One was a tractor driver, another was an RFS with a 
yearly contract, and the other two worked for periods of three to five months 
in several successive years. 
Table 8.4 compares wages paid to RFSs with what we call the Ryan-
Ghodake monthly wage equivalent (see chapter 9). This is the average annual 
daily wage in the irregular market multiplied by the probability of employ-
ment. The table reveals that the RFS wages in Akola exceed the monthly 
daily wage equivalent by up to 100 percent. Of the twenty-four RFSs, only 
nine were indebted to their employers. Of the nine cases of indebtedness, 
five were not loans but advances on wages given without interest. Obviously, 
interest on advances may be hidden in other terms of the contract. The 
interest rates charged on two of the loans were comparable to those a money-
lender would charge, namely, somewhere between one-quarter and one-half 
of the principal over a four- to five-month period. One of the advances 
appeared to include an even higher hidden or implicit interest rate, since 
the wage rate used for paying back the loans was roughly one-half of the 
normal monthly wage. Needless to say, at the end of the payment period 
the worker left his job . All nine loans or advances were taken for marriage 
purposes. Interlinking of labor and credit transactions therefore seems to be 
limited in these villages to cases in which laborers or small farmers work off a 
marriage loan (or advance on salary) over a period of roughly three to five 
months, during which they are fed by the remaining members of their family. 
The smaller of the two Akola villages, Kinkheda, appears to be fairly 
self-sufficient in terms of labor and neither imports nor exports substantial 
amounts of if daily. The larger village, Kanzara , has a labor surplus in all 
seasons except the harvesting season. Since the mid-1960s, when government 
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projects started to become an important source of employment for the 
laborers and small farmers of Kanzara , one man of the Mahar caste has 
become an important organizer of contract labor gangs for these projects. 
He organizes large gangs of laborers, preferably from his own village but 
also from other villages if necessary. Fo r one project in 1978, he drew together 
900 laborers with the help of organizers from other villages. Of the 900 
laborers, 400 came from Kanzara. 
On government projects families tend to work as a group and are paid 
on a piecework basis averaging out to Rs 7.00 or 8.00 per day. This implies 
that in this area, at least, females do not engage in such work on their own, 
but only as part of their families. In addition, workers on government 
projects can purchase highly subsidized food grains as a result of the Food 
for Work Program. 
The mukadam, as the labor organizer is called, supervises the work alone 
or, if there are large groups of laborers, with the help of additional super-
visors. He is paid roughly twice a laborer 's daily wages for supplying a group 
of thirty to fifty laborers and supervising them. He may also certify to shop-
keepers that some people are working on a government program, after which 
the workers can take small loans of Rs 10-20 from shopkeepers. It is assumed 
that he gets some money from the shopkeeper for that service as well. Two 
women, as well as the mukadam, organize large gangs of female workers for 
weeding during the monsoon season. They only negotiate the wages with the 
landlords and organize up to fifty women to work in a particular farmer's 
fields. They take twice a female worker's wages from the farmer for their 
service. This is the only area in which we found a man organizing gangs of 
women laborers for a female-specific agricultural operation. 
The mukadam is well liked by the workers ; he was elected to the village 
panchayat in the last two elections and was a member of the taluka-level 
panchayat for a two-year term. He seems also to be well liked by the farmers, 
although small farmers who require only small groups of laborers dislike 
the fact that they have more trouble getting those workers because of his 
activities. 
A striking feature of the area is that no consumption loans are made 
at the beginning of the monsoon period to small farmers and landless 
laborers. At the most, some shopkeepers may advance Rs 10-20 worth of 
supplies, usually on an interest-free basis and to be repaid very quickly.6 
It is our impression that the three- to five-month labor contracts that cover 
the lean season are operating as a substitute for consumption loans. This 
impression is strengthened by the fact that the monthly wages are often 
not paid at the end of the month but are given in small amounts of Rs 10-20 
every few days, with accounts kept of the amounts paid. Part of these wages 
6. Interest may (or may no t ) , of course, be hidden in the price in such circumstances. 
Labor Relations in the Semiarid Tropics of India 155 
is often given in kind but we have heard no complaint that the accounting 
price of whatever was given in kind was valued above the current market 
price. 
We did not note any caste-based patron-client arrangements. Such a 
system probably existed in the past. Also, our observations may have been 
biased, as the Akola sample includes only two families from the lowest 
castes. But the failure to observe such relationships is to be expected because 
of the generally open and unlinked nature of labor market transactions in 
Akola and the free way, for example, in which lowest caste people sit and 
converse with higher caste individuals. 
Sholapur District 
In Sholapur the majority of wage payments are in the form of cash. The 
RFS contracts are annual contracts (table 8.3). Individuals who ever were 
an RFS did this kind of work for an average of 7.5 years but usually split 
this period among several employers. Currently there are fewer RFSs in 
the Sholapur sample than in Akola, or in Aurepalle and Dokur combined. 
In Shirapur in the late 1930s, an R F S could earn Rs 40/year in cash 
and three bags (a total of 330 kg) per year of sorghum. The rate in 1962 for 
one respondent was Rs 400 plus three bags of sorghum. In 1979 the range 
was Rs 500-750/year, plus the same three bags of sorghum. In the 1930s 
there was an optional system, in which payment could be taken exclusively 
in cash. One respondent earned a flat rate of Rs 100/year and worked for 
seven years until he was married; the money went to his father who used 
it for family needs including the marriage of the respondent's brother. In 
1979 there also exists the option of working for cash wages but this is rarely 
taken. 
The basic ration of sorghum (330 kg/year or 28.5 kg/month) can provide 
an important part of the food needs of an average family. We observed 
two or three cases where RFSs receive meals for themselves instead of grain, 
but such cases are rare in Shirapur. However, they are more frequent in 
Kalman, in the same district. Wages in kind are less important there and 
are often provided in the form of meals rather than grain. 
Shirapur, as already noted, is an exceedingly drought-prone village. 
The importance of receiving wages in kind is evident. It is not surprising, 
then, that the basic food grain component of the RFS wage has remained 
essentially constant over at least the last forty years while the cash component 
has been driven up by inflation. Workers demand basic security in return 
for their contract, but employers are unwilling, in a scarcity zone, to assume 
risks beyond those represented by this level of kind payments. 
Several respondents noted that during the drought period beginning 
in 1972, many RFSs were laid off; the claim of RFSs on their employers 
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evidently does not extend to being carried through periods of prolonged 
scarcity. It is an open question whether this readiness to dismiss RFSs during 
period of great stress is increased by the existence of the drought relief 
projects discussed in the last section. Most respondents reported that the 
number of RFSs has declined substantially relative to the pre-1972 period; 
they ascribe this to the continued availability of employment opportunities 
from government projects. 
The possibility of obtaining the cash portion of the wage as an interest-
free advance continues to be a major motivation for entering the RFS 
relationships, and many of these advances are taken for marriage purposes. 
Usually the cash portion of the wage is given in two or three installments 
but the advances can be up to the full year's cash portion. Some respondents 
reported that before 1972 it was possible for an R F S to obtain more than one 
year's cash portion in advance but such transactions are no longer observed. 
The cash equivalent of total wages varies from Rs 75 to 105 and, as in 
Akola, exceeds the R y a n - G h o d a k e monthly wage equivalent by a substantial 
margin. 
Contract jobs are given only for harvesting. Labor supply for other agri-
cultural operat ions—once they are started—is assured by another region-
specific feature. If laborers are hired on the first day of a given operation 
(hand weeding, for example), they will work for several days for the same 
farmer until completion of the operation, unless sickness or work on their 
own farms prevents them from doing so. Farmers will stop the work only 
if forced to do so by weather conditions or lack of funds. During the entire 
operation, daily wages set on the first day are not renegotiated, regardless 
of what happens to market wages elsewhere in the village. This system enables 
farmers to estimate costs at the beginning of an operation nearly as accurately 
as if they were using contracts. 
Groups for government contract jobs are much smaller in Shirapur 
than in Kanzara and are less formally organized. Although, as elsewhere, 
they are always organized by males, the groups do include females who are 
not related to the male members and are hired as required. The network that 
do operate in these situations may be relatively unstructured, or they may 
be influenced by such phenomena as caste. 
Mahbubnagar District: Aurepalle 
The hired labor market in Aurepalle has a number of unique characteristics, 
many of which are linked to the caste system. Virtually all wages are paid 
in kind. The data on labor market participation (table 8.5) indicate that 
none of the members of the first two caste ranks in this village participates 
in the market for hired labor, whereas in Dokur (in the same district), 
members from all caste ranks participate. The RFSs are almost exclusively 
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TABLE 8.5. Caste Rank and Labor Market Participation, 1976-77 
Village 
Aurepalle 
Dokur 
Shirapur 
Kalman 
Kanzara 
Kinkheda 
Caste Rank* 
7 
6(6) 
6(6) 
4(4) 
2(2) 
Hi) 
1(1) 
6 5 
9(9) 2(2) 
2(2) 4(4) 
1(1) 9(9) 
1(1) 8(8) 
8(8) 3(3) 
3(3) 2(4) 
4 
8(10) 
12(12) 
1(1) 
2(2) 
1(1) 
8(8) 
3 
0(2) 
5(5) 
1(1) 
2(3) 
2(2) 
8(9) 
2 
1(2) 
2(2) 
2(2) 
2(2) 
14(17) 
0(2) 
1 
0(9) 
6(9) 
22(22) 
18(21) 
6(8) 
12(13) 
Total 
26(40) 
37(40) 
40(40) 
35(39) 
35(40) 
34(40) 
Note: To derive these ranks the authors, who were resident for a time in each village, 
ranked the castes appearing among their regular VLS respondents on the basis of general 
(social) status. The ranks for each caste were then reassigned, assuming for convenience a 
possibility of only 7 distinct ranks in any village. The number of castes actually encountered 
in each sample ranged from 8 to 12. 
* 7 is the lowest rank, I is the highest. 
The first figure in each pair is the number of households in a given caste rank that reported 
any amount of paid or exchange labor participation by any family member during the year 
1976-77. The figure in parentheses is the total number of households of that rank in the sample. 
recruited from the two lowest caste groups, which is not true in the other 
regions. 
Tha t caste is indeed a major factor in controlling males' access to labor 
opportunities (except for the daily rated market) is confirmed by the three-
caste census data and the r andom sample from it. Females ' access to all 
labor opportunities except daily rated agricultural labor is influenced by 
caste. 
Members of three castes were interviewed particularly intensively in 
Aurepalle regarding their labor market participation. Kurmas are shepherds 
by traditional occupation and are Hindus of low caste rank. Malas are 
ex-untouchables whose traditional occupation is agricultural labor. Madigas 
are leatherworkers by traditional occupation, and therefore are also ex-
untouchables. Their traditional trade has declined due to availability of 
industrially produced leather goods or substitutes for leather goods. 
Among working males the frequency of participation in the irregular 
market and the frequency of self-employment (other than as a shepherd) 
are about the same for the Mala and Kurma castes combined, compared 
with the Madigas. Only Kurmas work as shepherds; the RFSs come primarily 
from the Madiga caste—41 percent of all Madiga males currently work as 
RFSs. 
Table 8.6A shows the kinds of work done by those males in the three-
caste random sample who do not work as RFSs . Clearly, the Kurmas and 
Malas have much better access than the Madigas to higher paid contract 
jobs (primarily well digging or well deepening for farmers—no government 
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contracts are involved). The average number of hours worked per day in all 
types of jobs is nearly the same (although work intensity may differ). The 
better access to contract jobs results in substantially higher average daily 
wages for the Malas and Kurmas compared with the Madigas, which is 
statistically significant. Note that for females, the wage rate differences are 
much smaller but are still significantly different. The wage difference may 
be attributed in par t to the better access to contract jobs for Mala and Kurma 
women via their male family members. 
The main settlement of Aurepalle presently ( January -March 1980) has 
four groups of contract workers, all engaged in digging wells. The core 
membership of these groups is stable but additional workers are hired as 
necessary. Three of the groups have mixed caste membership—Malas, 
Kurmas , Bogama (dancers), Mangali (barbers), Chakali (washermen) or 
Telaga (cultivators)—but they do not include a single Madiga member. The 
fourth group comprises exclusively Madiga members. 
F rom the interviews with panel members and special informants, we 
found that Madigas are socially quite low in this village, where they are 
known as weak, lazy, and untrustworthy. This reputation is backed up by 
stories that are gross exaggerations. Twenty Madiga households received 
forty milk buffalo from government programs with credit provided two years 
ago, for example. Several informants claimed that all these buffalo were 
sold and the funds used for consumption purposes. However, of the twenty 
families, seventeen still have one buffalo and one family has two. Interest-
ingly, the Madigas occasionally described themselves in the same terms and 
showed signs of insecurity during the interviews. Given this alleged lack 
of reliability, it is most astonishing to find them concentrated in the R F S 
jobs, which require regular work attendance and skills in handling of the 
bullocks. Fur thermore , these relationships are based on trust in that they 
involve debt and present opportunities to steal crop outputs and other things 
from employers. Malas are also ex-untouchables but are reputed to be 
trustworthy and hardworking; a certain self-confidence was clearly reflected 
in their behavior during interviews. Their social status is much more com-
parable to that of the Kurmas and other poor-caste groups than to that of 
the Madigas. In the first round of interviews with panel members and special 
informants, the Malas and high-caste respondents told us that Malas virtually 
never work as RFSs and that they do virtually all of the physically hard 
contract work. Only the three-caste census revealed the distortion of reality 
in these statements (see table 8.6B). But they clearly indicate an ideology 
that appears to be useful both to the high-caste groups in fixing wages for 
RFSs and to the Malas and other caste groups in the competition for 
contract work. 
Unlike the situation in all other villages, the R F S relationship in 
Aurepalle sometimes extends to the wife or another female member of the 
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R F S household, who performs the duty of outside sweeper and/or calls the 
female daily rated laborers for the husband's employer, for whom she there-
fore works whenever the farmer has work at the same rate received by other 
female laborers. Fo r the calling of laborers and the outside sweeping she 
gets the equivalent of Rs 24-36/year in the form of various crop outputs 
and sometimes a sari. Whether or not the female member of the family 
does perform these duties appears to depend on mutual convenience—no 
special value is attached to these opportunities. 
Even more than in the other regions, RFSs in Aurepalle enter this 
relationship because of their need for loans. In the panel only one family 
that ever had a permanent servant had not taken a loan from the employer. 
A large par t of the loan demand arises from ceremonial expenses related to 
marriage, a l though consumption loans and medically related loans are also 
common. Male Madigas at the present time typically spend Rs 1,000 for 
their marriages, much of it raised as loans from their employers. They 
normally pay 18 percent interest to their employers for these loans, which 
is deducted from their wages. 
Table 8.4 shows the other normal wage conditions. Wages in Aurepalle 
are completely paid in kind and the total monthly cash equivalent of these 
wages is currently Rs 43 per month for the panel (valued at 1975-76 prices), 
the lowest of any village. It takes the RFSs on average 5.8 years to pay back 
the debts, at which time these laborers enter the daily wage market again. 
(They will usually not return to the R F S status unless compelled to by the 
need for a loan or by physical weakness—and then they become watchmen.) 
Most of this time is spent with the same employer, al though it is possible to 
change employers if the second employer is willing to buy off the loan from 
the first. Farmers can refinance these loans by borrowing from moneylenders 
at 18 percent interest. 
Regression equations were fitted to the twenty-seven observations of 
R F S wages using the following variables: I N T R A T E = interest rate on 
loans; A G E = age in years; Y R S A S R F S = years of experience as regular 
farm servant; C O W H E R D = cowherd dummy; K U R M A L A = dummy 
variable for Kurmas and Malas. (An F test indicated that separate dummy 
variables for Kurmas and Malas are not required, which is consistent with 
their otherwise nearly equal social standing.) The following three variables 
were also tried but were eliminated after an F test showed that jointly they 
did not add to the explanatory power of the regression: age squared, amount 
of loan outstanding, and a dummy variable indicating whether a female 
member of the household of the R F S was working as outside sweeper for 
the employer of the R F S . The final regression is as follows (standard errors 
are in parentheses and * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10 
percent and 5 percent levels, respectively): 
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W A G E / M O N T H = 52.0 - 0.88 I N T R A T E * + 0.19 A G E 
(.43) (.16) 
- 0 . 1 1 Y R S A S R F S - 22.54 C O W H E R D * * 
(.41) (2.82) 
+ 4.31 K U R M A L A * , 
(2.37) 
= .81, d . f . = 2 1 , F=23.7. 
The regression equation indicates that personal characteristics such as 
age and experience have little influence on the wage received and that the 
most massive wage differences are associated with the type of j o b done 
(cowherd or plowmen). The regression further shows that Kurmas and 
Malas are slightly favored over the Madigas in wage payments, which is 
consistent with the findings in table 8.6A, although the percentage difference 
in RFS wages is small compared with that in daily wages. The interest rate 
variable shows that the few favored individuals who pay low interest rates 
also enjoy other wage benefits. Over 80 percent of the variation in wage 
conditions is explained by this regression. Although nothing in it clearly 
supports or contradicts the effectiveness of wage fixing, the fact that per-
sonal characteristics have little to do with the wage received is consistent 
with it. 
Although there are individual variations in wage conditions, the wage 
fixing is perceived by both farmers and laborers as effective. For fifteen 
years prior to 1977 the agreed-upon wage was fixed at roughly 36 kg of 
paddy with 24 percent interest on loans. A one-day strike in 1977 organized 
by the Madigas enabled them to push the base condition to close to 45 kg 
and 18 percent interests on loans, but a second strike in 1978 was ineffective. 
The fixity of the wage in kind for RFSs over many years is in sharp contrast 
to the fluctuations in the wages each year in the irregular labor market 
(see table 9.1). 
The fixity of the wage in kind for permanent servants obviously shifts 
all the price risk of the labor contrast to the farmer. Given the low wages, 
laborers are probably quite interested in shifting all the price risk to the 
farmer and farmers are probably able to carry that risk relatively easily. 
At the present time, workers are grumbling that they would prefer cash 
wages because paddy prices are low. However, at the beginning of the VLS 
in 1975, we understood that workers preferred wage in kind when paddy 
prices were high. 
Table 8.4 shows that in Aurepalle, unlike the other villages, R F S wages 
are substantially below the R y a n - G h o d a k e monthly wage equivalent. We 
will return to this point in the last section, after discussing Dokur . 
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Mahbubnagar District: Dokur 
The main differences between Aurepalle and Dokur are as follows. (!) Labor 
demand and incomes are much higher in Dokur , as already discussed. 
(2) All caste groups participate in the hired labor markets, and only the two 
highest caste groups have never had any RFSs among their family members. 
(3) The large majority of panel members who were ever RFSs started as 
herdsmen between the ages of ten and fifteen years, and among those 
currently serving as RFSs there are only a few plowmen. (Indeed, to collect 
the wage information for plowmen in table 8.4, we had to go outside the 
pane! households.) 
We attr ibute the low number of plowmen to the superior earnings 
opportunities available as a result of temporary migration, which apparently 
has begun since the early 1950s. There is an extensive network of labor 
subcontractors in the Dokur area that recruits labor for these projects by 
advancing amounts of from Rs 200 to a maximum of Rs 1,000 to individuals 
or to units, each made up of a man and his wife, who agree to work for the 
subcontractor on large government projects for five to eight months. Sub-
contractors are usually family members of large and medium farmers from 
Dokur and surrounding villages, and they sometimes gather up to seventy 
laborers at one time. The advances are financed partly out of the sub-
contractors ' own funds, but most of the money is obtained from the con-
tractors who deal with the government. The projects are often quite far from 
D o k u r ; the most distant one we encountered was a railway project in 
Madhya Pradesh. Wages for both males and females working on these 
projects range from Rs 75 to Rs 100/month, plus two meals per day plus 
shelter at the work site. The monthly cash wage is applied against the 
advance, a l though workers can further borrow small amounts of Rs 10-50 
from the subcontractor while on the job . Medical costs, if provided, are 
adjusted in full against the worker 's salary. 
It is clear from our investigation and from the consistent statements of 
the workers themselves that the demand for advances is the primary motive 
for participation in this system. Table 8.7 shows that the households that 
provide RFSs are virtually the same as those which send out temporary 
migrants. It thus appears that the typical history of an individual in these 
families it first to work as a herdsman between the ages of ten and fifteen, 
serving up to the age of sixteen or eighteen, and then to begin daily farm 
labor supplemented by temporary migration to obtain project work during 
t h e o r y season. The availability of advances from project work obviates 
the need for marriage loans from employers of the R F S s ; in table 8.2, 
column 7, there are only three such cases out of twenty-four. Furthermore, 
in seven out of twenty-four cases, RFSs in Dokur did not take any loans 
from their employers. 
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It is not clear whether D o k u r ever had as poor conditions for RFSs as 
were observed in Aurepalle, but the similarities of the social structure and 
the agroclimate, as well as the proximity of the villages to each other, suggest 
that the situations may have been the same. The additional flexibility and 
opportunity to work and to take advances made possible by temporary 
migration appear to have transformed labor relations to a degree in Dokur, 
in favor of the laborers. Large farmers and high-caste farmers have also 
responded to the improved labor market opportunities by participating 
much more actively than their Aurepalle colleagues. 
INTERPRETATION AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section we interpret the evidence presented in this paper, placing 
special emphasis on the observed differences in the contract and RFS 
submarkets. Clearly, since we have only six villages, many of our inter-
pretations cannot be verified statistically, and since they are based upon 
many exogenous variables, alternative interpretations are possible. How-
ever, our interpretations have to be evaluated in conjunction with the many 
pieces of evidence presented in this paper as well as in the two companion 
papers on the same villages included in this volume (see chapter 5 and 9). 
Importance of the Amount and Alternative Sources of Labor Demand 
The presence or absence of substantial labor demand influences conditions 
in all submarkets. In Akola steady agricultural labor demand and demand 
from nearby government projects combine to put laborers in a superior 
bargaining position that is reflected in high wages and high incomes in all 
submarkets. Annual contracts have given way to shorter contracts, which 
enable laborers to shift to the submarket with the most attractive terms in 
the course of the year. Fur thermore, we believe that this steady demand has 
led to substantial erosion of the role of caste in controlling access to labor 
opportunities, al though sexual differentiation has been fully maintained here 
as elsewhere. We think that the operating factor here has been the growth 
of an agroeconomic environment in which there is steady demand for labor 
from a variety of alternative sources. Moreover, we feel that the Maharashtra 
State government 's Guaranteed Employment Program has been instrumental 
in the consolidation of these gains in the conditions of rural labor, providing 
an important addition to the labor demand that began at least a hundred 
years ago to grow with the greatly increasing importance of cotton in the 
area. 
In the Sholapur district, alternative labor opportunities have existed 
for a long time, as we noted earlier in our discussion of the growth of Sholapur 
city as a mill town and of the long history of drought relief works in that 
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area. Even though they are less well off than their Akola counterparts, 
laborers in Sholapur still enjoy fairly favorable conditions. Also, the recent 
intensification of government projects seems to have led to a decrease in 
the importance of R F S relationships and to have made them looser. 
Although Dokur has neither nearby government projects nor an urban 
labor demand, the strong labor demand coming from irrigation, in combina-
tion with the opportunities to migrate, results in fairly substantial labor 
incomes. The migration opportunities provide an alternative source of loans 
and employment to the RFS relationship and this employment has virtually 
replaced R F S work for adult males. Such beneficial effect on the labor market 
where migrants originate must be kept in mind when interpreting the bleak 
conditions that the temporary migrants may face at their locations of work 
and that are so well documented in Breman's paper (chapter 7). In important 
ways both the migrants and those whom they have left behind are better off. 
Monopsony and Caste Competit ion in Aurepalle 
Laborers in Aurepalle are penalized in all submarkets for the low level of 
labor demand from local agriculture and the absence of other opportunities. 
It is this absence of other local or more distant opportunities combined with 
the strong traditional caste system that appears to enable farmers to exercise 
monopsony control in at least the market for plowmen. This is the only 
village in which payments to plowmen fall substantially short of the R y a n -
Ghodake monthly wage equivalent, and this shortfall may be interpreted 
as a monopsony rent. 
Fo r the monopsony hypothesis to hold, it is quite immaterial whether 
workers respond to the low wages offered in the submarket for plowmen by 
selecting themselves into these positions if they find them attractive relative 
to other opportunities. The RFSs may indeed be the physically weaker 
members of the labor force al though the skill requirements are probably 
higher for these positions than for the more lucrative earth-digging contract 
jobs. (This statement is consistent with the higher wages received by plowmen 
in other areas relative to the R y a n - G h o d a k e monthly wage equivalent.) 
Selection is simply a response on the labor supply side to the conditions 
offered on the demand side, and whether these offers are low because of 
collusion or for other reasons is quite immaterial for the interpretation of 
these supply-related phenomena. 
Fur thermore, we believe that self-selection alone could not account for 
the very low wages of plowmen in Aurepalle. Personal characteristics such 
as age and experience fail to have a statistically significant effect on plow-
men's wages whereas caste does. Access to the more lucrative contract work 
opportunities is also caste related. 
In further support of the monopsony hypothesis one needs to take into 
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account the caste-related ideological superstructure used to justify the low 
wages. Since the majority of RFSs come from the allegedly weak, lazy, and 
unreliable Madiga group their " low productivity justifies the low wages" 
in the eyes of the villagers. Ideology seems to be used as a means to support 
farmer's control over this group of laborers although, as mentioned before, 
the ideology is at best a massive exaggeration. 
But why do RFSs from the Madiga and other low-caste groups go into 
so much debt for marriage when they have such a hard time paying it back 
and clearly dislike the R F S status? (They usually do not return to it unless 
forced to by misfortune.) The most likely reason is the necessity—frequently 
stressed by respondents when pressed on this issue—to validate themselves 
relative to their own caste group. Since access to many labor opportunities 
is indeed influenced substantially by caste, and since other economic oppor-
tunities are also caste related,7 expenditures on marriage for validation 
purposes may well be a rational investment decision, apar t from the social 
benefits of being a well-respected member of one's caste. 
In Aurepalle intercaste competition for contract jobs also seems to exist 
and suggests an interest on the par t of the Malas as well as on the part of 
the high castes in supporting the local ideology of the inferior Madiga. This 
could be so despite the fact that Malas suffer from the same untouchability 
restrictions as Madigas. These restrictions still prevent them from taking 
water from wells of caste Hindus, continue to force them to stand in their 
presence and to give high-caste members other marks of respect, and prevent 
them from performing R F S duties that require inside work. 
Labor Market Segmentation 
Throughout this paper we have avoided using the term "labor market 
segmentation." An operationally meaningful definition of segmentation 
must imply that (1) the segments of the market include distinctly different 
groups of individuals differentiated by such characteristics as caste, sex, age, 
wealth, or education, and (2) the individuals can move from one segment 
to another only with substantial difficulty. If individuals are not essentially 
immobile between the submarkets that form the different segments, wages 
in the submarkets will vary to compensate for differences in employment 
conditions such as hours of work, intensity of work, or skill requirements. 
Furthermore, if the groups in the segments are not identifiable by clear-cut 
characteristics or are mobile between submarkets, segmentation may hurt 
some individuals relative to others, but it will not penalize or benefit entire 
socioeconomic groups (and possibly, as a result, this will call for policy 
intervention on behalf of the specific groups). 
7. Madigas . for example, have been exclusive beneficiaries of a government housing 
scheme and a buffalo distr ibution scheme in Aurepalle. 
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Defined in this way, segmentation is virtually absent in the male sub-
markets in all villages except possibly Aurepalle. Participation in all sub-
markets is too broad-based and mobility among them is too high to consider 
them segments. Even in Aurepalle one may not want to use the term "market 
segment" to refer to the male R F S submarket and the market for contract 
jobs. The R F S submarket includes primarily poor young males, but virtually 
all of them leave that submarket before they reach the age of thirty, although 
often with great difficulty. Madigas predominate in this submarket, but 
other caste groups also participate in it, so it cannot be termed a caste-based 
segment in any case. The market for contract jobs is accessible by members 
of all castes, although Madigas may have more difficulty in entering it. But 
it is clearly not a segment since there is substantial mobility between this 
submarket and the daily rated submarket . 
On the other hand, one can clearly see distinct male and female segments 
in the markets in all villages. The male segments are generally not accessible 
to the females with very few exceptions, such as some of the harvesting 
operations and some of the earth-digging contract jobs . Even in these earth-
digging jobs the women generally do different tasks than the men; in all 
villages (with the exception of Shirapur) they have access to such jobs only 
via their male family members. In the regular submarket , as discussed earlier, 
females are also excluded from the submarket for plowmen and herdsmen. 
(Only one woman was observed watching crops.) The women are restricted 
to the few domestic servant jobs available. 
Males, of course, cannot generally move into women's jobs either, 
except for some elderly men or young children who participate in hand 
weeding, or boys who work as inside servants. But males would hardly desire 
to participate in the female submarkets. Male wages (adjusted for hours 
worked) in the irregular markets of these villages are roughly 80 percent 
higher than female wages. Male probabilities of employment are much 
higher as well (see Ryan, Ghodake , and Sarin, table 3). Segmentation clearly 
works in favor of the males and at the expense of the females. 
Ideological support for this segmentation is strong. A taboo prevents 
women from touching the plow and, as in other societies, males who do 
domestic chores or other female-specific tasks are ridiculed. Low wages for 
women are at t r ibuted—by both males and females—to the lack of physical 
strength and stamina of women. One need only see the loads carried by 
them and the discipline evident in the paddy transplanting lines to realize 
that the large observed wage differentials can hardly be explained in this 
way. 
Tied Transactions 
Tied transactions as a means by which the more powerful extract favorable 
terms for themselves in transactions with poorer partners have become a 
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topic of speculation (Bharadwaj 1974a; Bhaduri 1973) and have more 
recently become the focus of empirical investigation (Rudra 1975a, b; 
Bardhan and Rudra 1978). 
In all villages, labor-credit links are restricted to RFS contracts. They 
provide poor people with an opportunity to raise credit that would often 
be totally lacking. In Akola they are of such short duration that they are 
probably to be interpreted as being of mutual benefit in most cases. Although 
the contracts are of longer duration in Sholapur, their terms do not appear 
to be substantially below those available in other submarkets. Only in 
Aurepalle are terms of credit-linked RFS contracts clearly inferior. But 
we believe that it is not primarily the tying that puts the laborers at a dis-
advantage, but the effective collusion of farmers in the absence of alternative 
sources of labor demand. Without collusion or other forms of monopsony 
or monopoly power, the terms of tied transactions may thus reflect "com-
petitive" market conditions of supply and demand without an additional 
extraction of "rents" to the "stronger" partner. In this paper we have found 
little evidence that tied transactions in a submarket cannot be understood 
by a supply and demand framework for this type of transaction. Traditional 
analysis of market imperfections such as monopsony, monopoly, collusion, 
and restrictions to mobility can then be used to explain unequal or exploita-
tive terms in regions or villages where the imperfections can be documented 
empirically. 
